A
Concept Framework
For

FORCIBLE ENTRY OPERATIONS

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USJFCOM J9
Concepts Division (J92)

Joint Experimentation

Preface

This publication is Version 0.5 of U.S. Joint Forces Command's (USJFCOM) ***Forcible Entry Operations (FEO)*** White Paper. FEO is a functional concept that provides support to "integrating" concepts as described in USJFCOM's Joint Experimentation Campaign Plan 2000 (CPLAN 00). FEO also requires support from other functional concepts such as *Attack operations Against Critical Mobile Targets* (AOACMT).

This FEO White Paper responds to the April 1999 Defense Planning Guidance to develop and explore, through experimentation, new joint warfighting concepts and capabilities that will improve the ability of future JFCs to rapidly deploy and decisively conduct particularly challenging and important operational missions, such as forcible entry operations. This paper continues to expand our understanding of key constructs first described in *Joint Vision 2010* (*JV 2010*) and amplified in the *Concept for Future Joint Operations*. FEO encompasses many of *JV 2010*'s 21st Century Challenges and incorporates a number of *JV 2010*'s Desired Operational Capabilities. This paper also helps fulfill the concept development requirements described in CJCSI 3010.02 (*Joint Vision Implementation Master Plan*) and additional guidance from the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

The FEO concept focuses on the on the joint force at the operational level. It will describe how the joint force commander can rapidly deploy and employ forces against an adversary intent on denying access to U. S. forces in order to penetrate the adversary's territory to conduct operations or to establish theater entry points required to deploy decisive land air, and sea forces for follow-on combat operations.

FEO Version 0.5 expands on the CPLAN 00's FEO summary. It provides a framework of several constructs that will be examined in a series of future joint experimentation events. Results of these events will lead to publication of a Version 1.0 White Paper by December 2000.

Point of Contact

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A Concept Framework for **Forcible Entry Operations** in the 21st Century

1.0. Purpose. The purpose of Version 0.5 of the FEO White Paper is to provide an initial concept framework for experimentation to analyze and identify concepts and technologies that will allow us to better conduct Joint Forcible Entry Operations in the future. This is an initial step in the "concept definition" phase of concept development. This framework will help focus discussion of the FEO concept as a basis for further development of the **operational context, concept definition, identification of desired operational capabilities, and an initial experimentation strategy.**

Considerable turmoil in the world's regions will continue to produce civil strife, mass migration of refugees, famines, and even genocide well into the 21st century. These unsettling trends will be coupled with the threat of regional aggression. As the U.S. military responds, our adversaries may attempt to counter our force projection capabilities. This requires future joint forces that have responsive, credible, and sustainable forcible entry capabilities.

The U.S. military must be prepared to rapidly deploy and employ joint forces against capable adversaries who intend to deny U.S. access. The joint force must be able to integrate improvements to deployment, command and control, and combat power capabilities to secure positions from which to conduct follow-on sustained combat operations.

The Result: Accelerated forcible entry operations that enable sustained combat operations.

USJFCOM will work closely with Services, combatant commands, and DoD agencies to identify and incorporate near-term enhancements and lessons learned from recent operations and exercises into concept development and experimentation efforts. J-9 will publish Version 1.0 of this White Paper based on the results of these initial efforts.

2.0. Operational Context.

2.1 **The Task.** The April 1999 Defense Planning Guidance tasked USJFCOM to develop and explore, through experimentation, new joint warfighting concepts and capabilities that will improve the ability of future JFCs to rapidly and decisively conduct particularly challenging and important operational missions, such as conducting forcible entry operations against adversaries intent on denying access to U. S. forces.

Forcible Entry Operations

Operations to penetrate the adversary's territory to conduct operations or to establish theater entry points required to deploy decisive land, air, and sea forces for follow-on combat operations.

2.1. **Operational Requirement for an FEO Concept.** Power projection, enabled by overseas presence, and strategically located prepositioned equipment will likely remain the fundamental strategic and operational capability of our future force well into the early 21st Century. While the US seeks the cooperation of other governments in allowing US forces access to critical infrastructure, it cannot assume that cooperation will always be timely or forthcoming. Accordingly, the US must be able to establish a military lodgment on foreign territory through forcible entry, to enable follow-on operations as well as protect its forward operating bases. A joint forcible entry capability ensures that the US will have access to vital seaports, air bases, key transportation/access nodes and other critical facilities. A FEO could be the initial phase of a campaign or major operation such as to secure a lodgment for the introduction of follow-on forces. An important historical examples of a lodgment is the Normandy invasion, while the invasion of Okinawa or the landing at Inchon serve as examples of a single major operation to achieve a strategic or operational objective.

Forcible Entry is currently defined in the draft Joint Publication 3-18 as the seizing and holding of a lodgment in the face of armed opposition. In the future, highly mobile and lethal Joint Forcible Entry forces, supported by long-range precision fires, and enabled by focused logistics, and support from space, air, sea or land bases in areas outside the enemy's control, may be able to achieve their objectives without the necessity to seize and control a lodgment**. Regardless of the size, nature, or length of the operation or the requirement for lodgments, all forcible entry operations remain similar in that they require the penetration by ground elements of a joint force into territory defended by an adversary.** This capability to conduct forcible entry operations is essential to maintaining a credible military capability throughout the world.

2.3. **Future Threat.** Future adversaries, having learned from Desert Shield and Desert Storm, will no longer wait for the US to establish the parameters for a set-piece battle. They may employ a robust intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) architecture for targeting and combat assessment. They may combine a well-developed cruise and ballistic missile capability that allows for firing salvoes on in-theater bases and staging areas. They may also develop highly integrated air defense systems (IADS) to protect their offensive capability and infrastructure when the US begins to strike. In addition, their maritime activities, including mines, may be used to deny access to the region, further exacerbating US attempts to achieve its military objectives. Recognizing that US forces integrate information to provide a dynamic planning and execution system with a heavy reliance on space-based ISR systems, the adversary may use all necessary means to negate US systems while protecting their own. In the face of these future challenges, the US Joint Force of the 21st Century will have to be more innovative, flexible and employ at greater speed and achieve a greater lethality to conduct Forcible Entry Operations in locations around the world.

2.4. **Link to JV 2010.** The nation possesses a forcible entry capability now. The FEO Concept envisions a fully developed future joint forcible entry force with capabilities that we have only in varying degrees today. The future FEO capability will be linked to the four operational concepts set forth in JV 2010: *dominant maneuver, precision engagement, full-dimensional protection, and focused logistics*. It will attempt to leverage advancing technological trends in long-range precision capability, broader weapons effects, low-observable technologies, and improvements in information and integration technologies to develop a more capable, survivable, and effective FEO capability. CJCSI 3010.02, the Joint Vision Implementation Master Plan, identifies a number of 21st Century challenges relevant to the future environment. These include "Battlespace Awareness," "Rapid Joint Force Projection," and "Generating Precision Effects." This concept also uses *JV 2010* Desired Operational Capabilities (DOCs) as a point of departure for developing a wider set of FEO DOCs.

2.5. **Link to Other Experimentation Concepts.** The Forcible Entry Operations concept differs from the USJFCOM joint integrating concept, Rapid Decisive Operations (RDO), in that RDO is an end-to-end concept that aims for a quick decisive operational-level victory in support of strategic objectives. RDO does not focus on seizing and occupying territory in the battlespace except for a limited purpose, such as to generate an otherwise unobtainable opportunity for precision engagement, to secure a key decisive point, or to protect the civilian populace. In the context of RDO, FEO will help achieve these purposes. This will typically involve a contested invasion of enemy territory for the specific purpose of inserting forces on the ground or establishing conditions to help achieve decisive RDO objectives. The FEO of the future may be conducted as an element of an RDO or other operation with forces inserted on the ground to accomplish specific objectives and then withdrawn, without ever establishing a lodgment. In this regard, FEO could resemble a large-scale raid, but would still retain all the aspects of any other forcible entry operation, plus a planned withdrawal. In any case, FEO, like RDO, requires elements of all the other supporting Joint Experimentation concepts to be successful: Focused Logistics: Enabling Early Decisive

Operations; Attack Operations Against Critical Mobile Targets; Joint Interactive Planning; Common Relevant Operational Picture; Adaptive Joint Command and Control; Force Projection; and Information Operations. Initial experimentation efforts will focus on FEO as an element of RDO in spiral 2 which focuses on strike operations. Later experimentation will investigate FEO as part of a larger operation to include the requirement of creating a lodgment for the purpose of bringing in follow-on forces to or to conduct extended operations within the adversary's territory. Such operations could be a Major Theater War (MTW) or MOOTW.

2.6. **DOTMLP.** FEO will investigate concept options that may require new joint doctrine, organizations, training and education, materiel, leadership, and people (DOTMLP). In an attempt to "think outside the box," the concept is not constrained by current budget, strategy, or policy. Together, the convergence of JV 2010 concepts and technological capabilities envisioned by JV 2010 and being pursued jointly and by the Services will allow for a significantly greater capability to conduct FEO with higher speed, increased operational reach, and greater effectiveness.

2.7. **Current Doctrine.** Current doctrine provides the basis on which to develop the FEO concept. Key publications include these Joint Publications: *3-0, Joint Operations; 3-02, Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations; and 3-18, Joint Doctrine for Forcible Entry Operations (draft).*

3.0. The Concept.

3.1 Joint Publication 3-18, *Joint Doctrine for Forcible Entry Operations (draft)* defines forcible entry as "seizing and holding a military lodgment in the face of armed opposition." Our current Amphibious, Airborne, and Air Assault FEO capabilities are significant. But they must be improved to remain viable in the face of future challenges. As applied in this paper, the FEO concept will investigate how to improve these capabilities to provide an FEO capability that can be employed quickly from great distance, overcome or avoid obstacles, and that can be built up rapidly with sufficient power to be survivable and accomplish the mission. In addition to an inherent complexity, a long-standing problem of FEO has been that they normally commence outside enemy controlled territory with forces not in physical contact with the enemy and are executed inside enemy controlled territory. FEO forces must be able to overcome the problems of build up from zero combat power to a capable combat force before the adversary counters and destroys our lead elements.

3.2. Examples of earlier FEO include Normandy, Okinawa, Inchon, Grenada, and British operations in the Falklands. Kuwait, the FEO "that never happened," was a demonstration that provides an example of the impact of the mere threat of FEO by the number of Iraqi divisions that remained tied to the mission of defending against a potential FEO by amphibious landing. Distinguished from traditional forcible entry operations, we must look at different options for how we might conduct such operations in the future.

FEO would be planned by a JFC in conjunction with forces located at widely dispersed locations, both forward deployed and in CONUS. The FEO they plan should be characterized by operational surprise with rapid insertion of forces to conduct immediate, continuous, and overwhelming operations to shock and paralyze the adversary, destroy their ability to coordinate offensive and defensive operations, fragment their capabilities, and foreclose their most dangerous options.

Such an operation could commence with a concerted IO campaign to weaken and blind the adversary's ability to command and control his forces. SOF could be inserted to conduct critical pre-H Hour operations. Selected gaps must be created in the adversary's integrated air defense system and maritime and beach obstacles. These gaps must be sufficient in time and space to allow the insertion of amphibious forces from over the horizon at sea, air assault forces staged at ISBs or Mobile Offshore Bases, and airborne forces potentially transported all the way from CONUS bases to the vicinity of their objectives.

Amphibious forces conduct in-stride breaching, bringing selected elements quickly over the beach and moving rapidly inland. Working in concert and supported by long range precision fires and effects, coupled with highly lethal organic weapons and force protection technology, these initial insertion forces would maneuver rapidly to engage or avoid the enemy, seizing or destroying key objectives, focusing on the adversary's centers of gravity and critical vulnerabilities. These forces would focus on those objectives most appropriate for forces with "boots on the ground." Depending on the situation, these forces could be repositioned within enemy territory to seize other objective or they could be withdrawn to amphibious shipping or staging bases. Alternatively, missions could include longer-term tasks such as protecting civilians, or seizing and holding a lodgment for insertion of follow on heavy forces, or protecting private volunteer organizations (PVOs) and non government organizations (NGOs) in a MOOTW. A lodgment, perhaps consisting of ports and airfields would facilitate the landing of follow on Naval MPF or Army and Air Force prepositioned equipment and troops. Rapidly deployable "medium brigades" could follow by air within days. Follow-on Division size forces and MEF elements begin to arrive shortly thereafter.

3.3. The "quad" chart on the next page summarizes key elements of the concept. The hypothesis quadrant reflects the primary goal—to limit adversary success, rapidly build combat power, and accelerate mission accomplishment through assured success. The "desired capabilities" quadrant lists examples of the many potential DOCs that enable FEO. The following sections discuss some of the 21st Century Challenges and Desired Operational capabilities comprise the FEO concept.



3.4. **JV 2010 21st Century Challenges.** As a concept for an extremely complex combat operation, FEO is potentially related to virtually every one of the JV 2010 21st Century Challenges. The challenges to be discussed in the remainder of this White Paper are those that particularly relate to a Forcible Entry Operation associated with a Rapid Decisive Operation, i. e., insertion of forces deep into enemy territory to attack the enemy's center of gravity, to protect civilians, or to create otherwise unattainable opportunities for precision engagement. Such FEO could consist of a small element inserted by a single means, such as a raid by MEU (SOC) elements inserted and extracted by MV 22 and/or LCACs; an airborne operation by a Ranger or Airborne Infantry Battalion followed by dispersal and exfiltration to safe haven by foot or helicopter; or an air assault raid initiated from and recovering to a forward support base or Mobile Offshore Base (MOB). For purposes of this paper, we envision a larger integrated FEO involving two or more means of insertion, lasting at least a few days and involving maneuver and engagement of multiple objectives in the enemy's territory. The creation of a lodgment and the insertion of follow-on forces in these cases are not anticipated. More extensive operations including the creation of a lodgment will be investigated in future experimentation spirals.

3.4.1. **Joint Command and Control.** The JFC for an FEO will be required to plan and execute with a variety of geographically separated forces, some forward deployed and some based in CONUS or other theaters. The highly complex nature of integrated FEO and separation of

21st CENTURY CHALLENGE
Joint Command and Control

The JFC should be able to combine increased battlespace awareness, advanced planning capabilities, and assured communications to apply the proper balance of JV 2010's new operational concepts to achieve decisive operations.

forces will require the capability to conduct military planning in an entirely new way. The JFC and his staff must be able to centralize their planning efforts while less centralized in location. The ability to rapidly exchange information around the globe and throughout the battlespace enable the sequential, linear planning of the past to give way to the rapid, simultaneous, interactive planning required by FEO. The JFC will use the three operational constructs of the Joint Interactive Planning concept, which include; an **interactive joint planning group** (JPG) which is both virtual and collaborative; second, an **adaptive, tailored planning process** that improves on the current crisis action planning process; and lastly, **a dynamic shared plan** with implicit understanding maintained throughout the battlespace, increasing unity of effort and speed of command. Likewise, in the execution of FEO, the requirement to penetrate the enemy's battlespace and to control operations while operating deep within the enemy's territory will present significant challenges. Our future systems must enable leaders at all levels to leverage more fully the capabilities of the entire force and achieve a tempo of operations that will hold off and eventually defeat an initially numerically superior force operating in his own territory.

21st CENTURY CHALLENGE
Battlespace Awareness

The JFC should be able to use a common relevant operational picture to achieve battlespace awareness of friendly, enemy, and neutral forces, improve the art of decision making, and provide for more efficient decisive operations.

3.4.2. **Battlespace Awareness.** FEO are extremely complex and potentially risky. The JFC must have available a common relevant operational picture to achieve battlespace awareness of friendly, enemy, and neutral forces, improve decision-making, and provide for more efficient operations. An unprecedented level of battlespace awareness will permit subordinate leaders to operate more effectively within the commander's intent without requiring direct control. However, the same capabilities will enable commanders to monitor and directly control the actions of their forces at lower echelons, thus allowing a greater degree of centralized control when required. The JFC should be able to vary the degree of control based on the situation. In spite of the potential to centralize control, appropriate decentralization and self-synchronization will more fully exploit the capabilities of agile organizations and the initiative of leaders at every level. Information processing must all share and promote battlespace awareness—a real-time, common, relevant picture of the battlespace. Battlespace awareness will not eliminate the fog of war, but will yield a much-improved visualization of the battlespace in space, time, and effect, regardless of terrain, weather, or time of day. The USJFCOM CPLAN 00 functional concept, *Common Relevant Operational Picture (CROP)*[1], contains a detailed discussion of the ways and means to address this JV 2010 challenge.

[1] The USJFCOM J-9 approved the CROP concept White Paper, Version 1.0, on 3 Sep 99.

3.4.3. **Information Operations (IO).** IO provide a variety of non-kinetic precision engagement options to the JFC. Defensive IO—to protect friendly systems and capabilities essential to information superiority—will begin early in an FEO and continue throughout. Likewise, the JFC can use offensive IO very early in the operation—even before the joint force deploys—to influence, disrupt, deny, exploit, destroy, or otherwise affect an adversary's information environment, thereby increasing the information differential in the JFC's favor and allowing the FEO force the advantage it needs to penetrate the enemy's battlespace and achieve its objectives. Information operations can be a significant combat multiplier, essential to the success of any FEO.

21st CENTURY CHALLENGE
Information Operations

The JFC should be able to mitigate the effects of adversary information operations (IO) and protect our networks from unauthorized infiltration while influencing, disrupting, denying, exploiting, or destroying the adversary's information capabilities.

3.4.4. **Rapid Joint Force Projection.** Operational surprise is a critical factor in the success of an FEO. This requires the ability to rapidly project the joint force from varied locations, potentially around the globe. The ability to fulfill this requirement will be greatly facilitated by the realization of 21st Century Challenges associated with rapid joint force projection, both in terms of greater lift capacity and the reduction in the size and increased lethality of the forces to be lifted. This focuses on moving forces rapidly to positions of strategic and operational advantage. This will be further enabled by enhanced global situational awareness resulting from a common relevant operational picture (see the CROP concept, mentioned earlier). There is a related focused logistics challenge (Joint Deployment and Rapid Distribution discussed below) that concentrates on peacetime initiatives associated with enhancing transportation infrastructure to facilitate rapid deployment prior to and throughout a crisis. Forward presence forces, prepositioned assets, and innovative basing options should greatly increase force projection agility and responsiveness. The organic lift capability of forces, such as that afforded the Marines and SOF by the V-22 Osprey will facilitate the initial insertion of forces as well as to maneuver and support those forces once committed. The mobility and agility thus afforded joint forces should enable the JFC to extend his operational reach and allow him to strike simultaneously with multiple systems throughout the battlespace. The **Force Projection for Rapid Decisive Operations** Concept outlines in greater detail the key constructs to enable the deployment of the joint force in conducting an FEO in a rapid decisive operation.

21st CENTURY CHALLENGE
Rapid Joint Force Projection

The JFC should be able to execute rapid deployment worldwide, quickly occupy and influence the battle space, and reduce time to build combat power in order to seize momentum and gain multi-dimensional positional advantage.

21st CENTURY CHALLENGE
Joint Deployment and Rapid Distribution

Delivery of combat units with reduced logistics footprint will be required. Tailored support and sustainment will be delivered directly to the JOA

3.4.5. **Joint Deployment and Rapid Distribution.** FEO present an extremely difficult deployment and sustainment problem. Deploying forces must converge on the objective area from locations around the world. All must be timed to arrive nearly simultaneously, and with the maximum combat power available. FEO forces must be as self-sustaining as possible, but in any case will require continued sustainment from external sources, particularly as the length of the operation extends. Requirements for sustainment increase with the intensity of combat. Until some form of significant lodgment is opened, the same gaps in obstacles and integrated air defenses that had to be created for initial insertion must continue to be held open or be reopened in order to bring in sustainment. Focused logistics with tailored support packages using innovative delivery means will be required.

21st CENTURY CHALLENGE
Battlespace Control

If the JFC can control the battlespace by achieving dimensional superiority protecting his force, and maintaining friendly access, then he will set the conditions for rapid decisive operations

3.4.6. **Battlespace Control.** For FEO to succeed, the JFC must be able to control the battlespace. This requires that the JFC retain the freedom of action to mass the effects of combat power while limiting the opponent's freedom of action. If the JFC can control the battlespace by achieving dimensional superiority, protecting his force, and maintaining friendly access, then he will have set the conditions for successful FEO.

21st CENTURY CHALLENGES
Generating and Integrating Precision Effects

Throughout the range of military operations, the JFC should be able to rapidly select the best mix of forces, weapons, and platforms to overwhelm the enemy through the precise and unrelenting application of required effects while minimizing collateral damage.

3.4.7. **Generate Precision Effects.** The FEO forces will require highly responsive precision effects to offset the disadvantages associated with the initial build up from zero combat power. We must be able to accurately locate, identify, and engage relevant targets in a timely manner against a full range of operational targets throughout the depth of the battlespace. Critical objectives might draw FEO forces to urban areas or the enemy may counter FEO forces by conducting operations in urban areas where collateral damage to non-combatants must be minimized.

3.4.8. **Integrate Precision Effects.** Precision Engagement is more than just precision weapons. The challenge associated with FEO is to develop a well-fused C4ISR process that will enable the optimal application of precision effects to enhance the combat effectiveness of engaged FEO elements. This is particularly true in the early stages of an FEO when the force is most vulnerable, but also extends through the duration of the operation. Precision effects focus primarily on operational effects, not on the means by which effects are achieved. The JFC, for example, could employ forces, an array of weapons and munitions (including non-kinetic means), a range of information operations, or a combination of those means at decisive points and times to assist in protecting the force and accomplishing FEO objectives.

3.4.9. **Force Medical Protection.** FEO are about combat and combat involves casualties and other medical risks. These risks are increased and complicated by the nature of operations within enemy territory. A large medical footprint within the FEO operational area is not viable. Evacuation of casualties faces all the same hazards as initial insertion and sustainment of forces. Definitive care decreases mobility of engaged forces. A tailored self-supporting highly mobile medical force package must be an integral part of an FEO to support each FEO objective.

21st CENTURY CHALLENGES
Force Medical Protection

The joint force requires an overarching system to protect against medical hazards and operational risks, as well as focus on in-theater definitive care.

3.4.10. **Decisive Combat Operations.** FEO must employ many of the same capabilities that exist in the Rapid Decisive Operations Concept in order to be successful in Forcible Entry Operations in the future. It is imperative to address accomplishment of all of the challenges described above which will ultimately enable the success of FEO in Decisive Combat Operations.

21st CENTURY CHALLENGE
Decisive Combat Operations

With increased battlespace awareness, rapid joint force projection, and multi-dimensional superiority, the JFC should be able to simultaneously employ tailored force packages in high-tempo, intense joint operations to achieve decisive results.

4.0. Desired Operational Capabilities

4.1. Joint operations in the 2010 timeframe will depend on fielding a wide range of capabilities to enable command and control, dominant maneuver, precision engagement, and other JV 2010 capabilities. The established list of DOCs developed by the JV 2010 Coordinating Authorities provide a foundation for developing a comprehensive set of desired operational capabilities tailored to FEO requirements. For experimentation, each one will be expanded to include appropriate tasks, conditions,

and standards with associated Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) and Measures of Performance (MOPs)

4.2. Selected DOC and DOC categories are described as they apply to FEO.

- **Provide Real-time Battlespace Awareness**— This provides real-time or near real-time battlespace awareness to the JFC, subordinate commanders, and staffs at all levels. This DOC is essential to the survival and success of an FEO force penetrating and operating in the enemy's battlespace.

- **Achieve Unity of Effort**— The JFC will regulate forces and functions to focus, integrate, and synchronize actions throughout the battlespace. It includes DOCs related to organizing the joint force headquarters and task organizing the joint force. This DOC is critical to the success of the varied elements involved in FEO.

- **Achieve and Preserve Battlespace Control**— This is required in order to ensure freedom of friendly action. It includes DOCs that relate to achieving air, land, sea, space, and electromagnetic superiority.

- **Generate Overmatching Lethal and Non-lethal Effects**— This is the capability to provide a decisive advantage in range, probability of hit and kill, efficiency of effects, and relative combat power. It includes DOCs associated with precision engagement, combat identification, and offensive information operations.

- **Synchronize Employment of Forces to Achieve Desired Effects**— The capability to synchronize joint operations of widely dispersed forces against multiple centers of gravity (simultaneously if necessary).

- **Conduct Short-notice Global Maneuver and Attack**— The capability to rapidly deploy, maneuver, and attack with forces sufficient to accomplish the mission. It includes focused logistics DOCs that relate to strategic deployment as well as inter- and intra-theater mobility in support of FEO.

- **Protect Forces, Facilities, and Capabilities**— This is a relatively broad category that includes specific full-dimensional protection DOCs related to early detection and engagement of those threats that are most dangerous to mission accomplishment. It includes threats such as air and missile threats that are WME capable or heavy ground maneuver forces maneuvering to engage relatively light FEO elements. It also includes DOCs related to precision engagement, defensive information operations, and combat identification.

- **Affect Adversary Ability to Observe the Battlespace**— This increases the information differential in the FEO force's favor, thus contributing to information superiority and creating confusion for the adversary.

- **Affect Adversary Ability to Command and Control Forces**— This disrupts, destroys, or otherwise affects the adversary's C2 systems, thus greatly weakening his planning and execution processes.

5.0. Experimentation Strategy Overview

5.1. The FEO experimentation strategy will be initially linked to the study of the RDO concept. It will also attempt to capitalize on investigation and discovery opportunities presented in the near-term experimentation processes of the Services and other organizations that are associated with FEO. Later experimentation will investigate FEO as an element of both MOOTW and Major Theater of War. The USJFCOM major joint integrating event (MJIE) or package of events in 2004 will include FEO. Initial focus areas and corresponding groupings of DOCs and associated Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) task sets for investigation have been identified above.

5.2. During 4th Quarter, FY 00 USJFCOM will participate in a major leveraged experiment, MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE 00, that will combine the opportunities associated with the four independent Service experiments. These are the Army's Joint Contingency Force-Advanced Warfighting Experiment (JCF-AWE), the Air Force's Joint Expeditionary Force Experiment (JEFX), the Navy's Fleet Battle Experiment-Hotel (FBE-H), and the Marine Corps' Urban Warrior MOUT ACTD. By providing the joint force headquarters, USJFCOM will leverage a significant opportunity to investigate emerging architectures associated with several concepts including FEO. Service observations relating to FEO will be collected and reviewed for operational level application on the FEO concept.

5.3. Selected Service and Joint Exercises involving FEO such as JTFEX or the Unified Endeavor series will be investigated for possible FEO joint experimentation venues, but will not interfere with the training and evaluation aspects of such events.

5.4. Beyond 2000, we will refine experimentation using the results of the findings and insights gained during the first year. The strategy will again focus on a USJFCOM-generated investigation series complemented by increased efforts to leverage high pay-off experimentation venues in the JE community at large.

5.5. Following are initial experimentation questions for the FEO concept:

- What is the size, composition, and capability of the FEO Force? How would it be organized?

- How long will it take the FEO force to position forces to execute a forcible entry operation? How can operational and tactical surprise be maintained? What operational deception measures could be employed?

- What is the best organization for the joint force command element and its subordinate service or functional elements?

- What are the new warfighting capabilities of the FEO force?

- How mobile is the FEO force? How does the FEO force achieve and maintain tactical and operational mobility once employed?

- What is the balance between forces that are light enough to be lifted into the enemy's territory and heavy enough to survive and prevail?

- What are the firepower requirement and how does the force receive timely and accurate fires?

- How will the FEO force sustain itself once employed?

- What are the major adversary counters to forcible entry operations? How can they be overcome or neutralized? How could the adversary counter the capabilities of the joint force at the strategic, operational, and tactical level?

- How does the joint force protect itself against attack by heavy forces? Against attack by light forces with significantly superior numbers?

- What are the effects on leadership, morale, and sustainability of deep operational force projection? What are the human implications of FEO to include the impact of operating within the enemy's territory in the midst of potentially overwhelming forces? Will the possibility of limited medical evacuation affect the morale of the force?

- How do advanced information systems such as CROP and inter-active combat ID increase operational understanding of the battlespace and allow the joint force to accept risk that previously would have been unacceptable?

Rick recommended holding this out and putting it in Version 1.0

4.2. Version 1.0 of the FEO White Paper will discuss DOCs in more detail. The following DOCs are considered critical to the execution of Forcible Entry Operations in support of RDO:

- Command and Control
  - Situational Awareness
  - CC-07/04 Direct Military Action
  - CC-09 Achieve Unity of Effort
- Dominant maneuver
  - DM-03 Rapidly Integrate Force Arriving in JOA
    - DM-05 Achieve and Preserve Battlespace Control
  - DM-07 Generate Overmatching Lethal and Non-Lethal Effects
  - DM-24 Synchronize the Employment of Forces to Achieve Desired Effects
  - Seize and Hold Deep Military Objectives
- Full Dimension Protection
  - FDP-04 Early Engagement of Air and Missile Threats
  - FDP-09 Detect Entities in the Combatants' AOR
  - FDP-10 Locate Entities in the Combatant's AOR
- Focused Logistics
  - FL-05 Fully Enabled Mobility System to Optimize Rapid Joint Projection
  - FL-06 Deployment and distribution of Required Forces and Sustainment at the place and time required
  - FL-07 Support Rapid Force Maneuver within the JOA
  - FL-33 Tailor Units to Provide Essential Care in Theater and Enhanced Care During Evacuation to Definitive Care
- Information Superiority
  - BA-03 Identification of Friendly, Adversary, and Neutral Forces and Non-Combatants
  - BA-04 Real-Time Battlespace Awareness
  - BA-05 Comprehensive Battlespace Awareness to Support the Full Range of Military Operations
- Information Superiority – Information Operations
  - IO-03 Affect the Effectiveness of Adversary Forces
  - IO-08 Protect the Effectiveness of Friendly Forces
- Precision Engagement
  - PE-04 Identify, Prioritize, and Command/Control Effects Against Battlespace Objectives and Targets
  - PE-07 Time Critical Targeting
  - PE-08 Fratricide Prevention
- PE-10 Integrate Battlespace Fire and Maneuver

- PE-11 Fused Battlespace Sustainment